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ABSTRACT 
YouTube is one of the most popular video-sharing websites on the Internet, 
allowing users to upload, view and share videos with other users all over the 
world. YouTube contains many different types of videos, from homemade 
sketches to instructional and educational tutorials, and therefore attracts a wide 
variety of users with different interests. The majority of YouTube visits are 
perfectly innocent, but there may be circumstances where YouTube video access 
is related to a digital investigation, e.g. viewing instructional videos on how to 
perform potentially unlawful actions or how to make unlawful articles. 
When a user accesses a YouTube video through their browser, certain digital 
artefacts relating to that video access may be left on their system in a number of 
different locations. However, there has been very little research published in the 
area of YouTube video artefacts. 
The paper discusses the identification of some of the artefacts that are left by the 
Internet Explorer web browser on a Windows system after accessing a YouTube 
video. The information that can be recovered from these artefacts can include the 
video ID, the video name and possibly a cached copy of the video itself. In 
addition to identifying the artefacts that are left, the paper also investigates how 
these artefacts can be brought together and analysed to infer specifics about the 
user’s interaction with the YouTube website, for example whether the video was 
searched for or visited as a result of a suggestion after viewing a previous video. 
The result of this research is a Python based prototype that will analyse a mounted 
disk image, automatically extract the artefacts related to YouTube visits and 
produce a report summarising the YouTube video accesses on a system. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
YouTube is a popular site for sharing videos which contains a wide range of 
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content. While the majority of YouTube visits are perfectly innocent, there may 
be circumstances where YouTube video access is related to a digital investigation, 
e.g. viewing instructional videos on how to perform potentially unlawful actions 
or how to make unlawful articles. This paper investigates the extent to which 
these video accesses can be identified. This paper makes a number of 
contributions. Firstly it documents some of the artefacts that can be left as a result 
of a YouTube visit, particularly that the title of the video can be recovered. It also 
demonstrates that it is possible to infer about how a user arrived at a particular 
page, either from information extracted from the URL or by creating a timeline of 
the artefacts and examining other events that occurred immediately before or 
after. The paper also describes a prototype tool that will identify the patterns of 
artefacts and report a summary of the YouTube activity. 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Overview 
This section provides a brief discussion of YouTube, followed by an explanation 
of the need for automation in digital forensics, highlighting the increase in the 
volume of data that analysts are faced with, but also the need to maintain an audit 
trail from raw data to interpreted data and any inferences drawn. The section also 
includes a discussion of work related to YouTube digital forensics. 
2.2 YouTube 
YouTube was founded in 2005 as a video sharing website where users can find, 
watch and share videos with others.  YouTube has currently over 100 million 
users across the world with approximately 2 billion views per day. It also has over 
24 hours of video uploaded every minute [1] and as a result of this, YouTube 
videos inevitably cover a large range of video topics including political, 
instructional and educational videos. 
YouTube has strict policies relating to what can and cannot be uploaded to their 
website. Videos containing extremism, animal abuse, bomb making or sexual 
activities are examples of video content that violates these policies and uploading 
videos with content along those lines is prohibited.  Although YouTube have 
these policies in place, YouTube [2] relies on users to detect inappropriate 
content, stating that “when a video gets flagged as inappropriate, we review the 
video to determine whether it violates our Terms of Use—flagged videos are not 
automatically taken down by the system”. A consequence of this review process 
is that it is possible that videos containing illegal or inappropriate content may 
exist on YouTube for anyone to view for a period of time.  Furthermore, it is 
important to remember that digital investigations do not necessarily have to be 
part of a law-enforcement investigation and may be an investigation into a 
violation of acceptable use policies in a corporate environment [3], or even an 
investigation in a education environment into ‘cyber-bullying’[4]. 
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2.3 Automation in Digital Forensics 
Event reconstruction is an integral part of any digital investigation; as described in 
Casey [5]; it is the process of piecing together evidence during the initial stages of 
an investigation to help develop a better understanding of what events actually 
took place.   
As part of a digital investigation it is necessary to manually examine and extract 
artefacts from a suspect system and carry out event reconstruction. This process 
can be difficult and time consuming due to both the complexity of today’s 
systems and the volume of data they can hold.  Over the past few years the 
amount of data on digital devices has increased dramatically and as a result, the 
workload for investigators has also increased.  By introducing a system that 
automatically identifies artefacts and reconstructs them into events, the time spent 
by investigators on the higher level analysis phase of an investigation can be 
increased. In addition, given the increase in number of digital devices that can be 
involved in an investigation, it can also be necessary to prioritise the examination 
of one system over another, either due to resource limitations or the time sensitive 
nature of an investigation [6]. Automation could help in this prioritisation. 
However, there is a difficulty with automating part of a digital forensics 
investigation, in that conclusions drawn may ultimately need to be presented in 
court. Principle 3 of the ACPO Guidelines on Computer-Based Electronic 
Evidence is particularly relevant, which states that “an audit trail or other record 
of all processes applied to computer-based electronic evidence should be created 
and preserved. An independent third party should be able to examine those 
processes and achieve the same result” [7].This is also discussed in Carrier [8] 
which describes that error can be potentially introduced at each layer of 
abstraction when using forensic analysis tools, and that this error rate should be 
captured and taken into account when considering the results. Automated tools 
should therefore be able to ‘explain’ any results produced or conclusions that are 
drawn, preferably making it straight forward to manually verify the results and 
highlighting any potential error. 
2.4 Related Work 
There has been a small amount of published research on the forensic analysis of 
YouTube use.  Sureka et al [9] describes a semi-automated system that mines 
YouTube with the purpose of discovering both extremist videos and hidden 
communities.  Their work has been developed to aid law enforcement in dealing 
with cyber-crime in the area of radicalisation and has demonstrated that the 
automation of even part of a manual process can be beneficial to investigators in 
terms of time and overall success rate. However, while the paper is related to 
YouTube, is focused on detection of online data and does not assist in the 
examination of hard disks that are typically the source of evidence in digital 
forensic analyses. 
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There has also been some research carried out in the area of automated tools for 
answering ‘higher-level’ questions in digital investigations.  While not related to 
YouTube, Adelstein and Joyce [10] describes an automated extraction tool 
capable of determining the presence of peer-to-peer software installed on a system 
and extracting evidence based on those results in a forensically sound manner. 
The developed tool automates what is described as a “manual and labor-intensive 
process” and demonstrates that this sort of automated analysis is feasible, and 
suggests that in some cases it is desirable. 
2.5 Summary 
This section has shown that evidence of YouTube activity may be of interest in 
the course of some digital investigations and that there is little published work on 
the topic. It has also shown that due to the volume and complexity of data 
encountered in the course of investigations some level of automation is 
advantageous. However, it has also discussed that while automation is useful to 
address these problems, since the output of an analysis may eventually need to be 
used in court, an automated tool should provide a full audit trail of how results 
were produced. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Overview 
As discussed in the introduction, this research investigates the possibility of 
producing an automated summary of a user’s activity on YouTube for the purpose 
of highlighting to an investigator that there may be related evidence of interest. 
The research described in this paper is split into several stages. First, the artefacts 
that are left on a computer after a user has visited YouTube are identified. 
Secondly, experiments are conducted to determine what specific user behaviour 
can be inferred from the presence of the artefacts. Finally, in order to automate the 
process, a tool is developed that can extract the artefacts and supply an 
appropriate summary of user activity based on what has been extracted. The 
remainder of this section discuses these steps in detail. 
3.2 Scope 
As discussed earlier, YouTube videos are usually accessed through a web 
browser, which in turn runs on an operating system. There are a several browsers 
(e.g. Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome, Safari, Opera) and several operating 
systems (Windows XP, Vista and 7, Mac OS X, multiple distributions of Linux), 
not to mention dedicated YouTube apps as found on iOS. This paper particularly 
examines the artefacts left when Internet Explorer 8 is used for this viewing on 
Windows 7. Also, the paper considers viewing YouTube videos directly on the 
YouTube website rather than embedded videos in other sites. 
3.3 Artefact Identification 
The first step in the reconstruction of a user’s visit to YouTube is to identify the 
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artefacts left behind.  There are a number of different methods available that can 
be used to help identify changes to a system. These are discussed in Hargreaves & 
Chivers [11] the first of which is live logging, i.e. the process of recording 
changes to a live system with the help of tools such as Procmon1. The second 
method is using snapshots, which involves taking a copy of a test system before 
and after an action is carried out and identifying the differences between the two 
states. The last method involves creating a list of all the files on the system after 
the interaction has taken place and sorting them by date and time to identify any 
changed files.  
For this research the last method is considered most appropriate. Since the aim of 
the research is to automate some of the event reconstruction process, meta-data 
associated with files e.g. dates and times, are particularly important. As a result, in 
terms of file system artefacts, only files with records that remain in the Master 
File Table (MFT) are considered, rather than supplementing them with those 
recoverable using file carving techniques. However, the time-based listing of files 
is extended, and in addition to the Modified, Accessed, Created and Entry 
Modified (MACE) times recovered from the file system, some compound files 
(e.g. the Registry hives[12] and index.dats [13] used by Internet Explorer) are also 
processed and integrated with the entries from the file system. 
Test data is generated through the use of experiments with virtual machines. In 
this case VMware Workstation2 is used to virtualise a Windows 7 environment 
and various YouTube sites are visited. At all times the actions taken when using 
the test system are recorded. After visiting the websites, duplicates are made of 
the virtual machine’s hard disk (the .vmdk file), and in addition to the generation 
of the sorted list of file system, Registry and index.dat times, where further details 
need to be extracted, tools such as X-Ways Forensics3, NetAnalysis4, and 
Nirsoft’s suite of History, Cache and Cookie Viewers5 are used. 
3.4 User Behaviour 
Once the artefacts that are produced during a YouTube visit are identified, the 
next step is to compare each set of artefacts with the user’s behaviour. As 
discussed in the previous section, the actual user behaviour in the test 
environment is documented, which allows artefacts and user actions to be 
compared. There are several distinct ‘behaviours’ that are examined. These are: 
 
 The viewing of a video, 
                                                          
1 Process Monitor - http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb896645 
2 VMware Workstation - http://www.vmware.com/products/workstation/ 
3 X-Ways - http://www.x-ways.net/forensics/ 
4 NetAnalysis - http://www.digital-detective.co.uk/netanalysis.asp 
5 Nirsoft tools - http://www.nirsoft.net/ 
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 The viewing of a video as a result of a YouTube suggested video, 
 A YouTube search, 
 The viewing of a video as a result of a YouTube search. 
 
The purpose of testing these different behaviours is to examine the variation in 
artefacts left by a user visiting a YouTube site in different ways. Hargreaves [14] 
discusses the importance of demonstrating that a user had intent to visit a 
particular website. In this case there may be a question over whether the user 
viewed a page containing a video as a result of following a link from another 
page, a link in an instant message or email, from a suggested video, or as a result 
of using a particular search term.  
3.5 Automation 
The final stage of this research is the development of a tool that automatically 
examines artefacts left (determined from the earlier experiments) and produces a 
summary describing the interaction of a user with YouTube, including any 
specific behaviour that it is possible to infer. The tool also must provide full 
explanation of how any inferences are made. The tool is tested against other 
virtual machine disk images where known actions were performed, and the results 
compared to determine if the inferred behaviour mirrors reality. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Overview 
This section describes the results that were obtained using the methodology 
described in the previous sections, i.e. the identification of artefacts, inference of 
behaviour and automation of event reconstruction. This section is divided up to 
correspond with these stages in the methodology. 
4.2 Artefact Identification 
As described in Section 3.3, videos were viewed on YouTube using a Virtual 
Machine (VM) of Windows 7. As a result of the examination of the VM disk 
images, a number of key artefacts were identified that relate to a user visit to 
YouTube. These can include a URL that incorporates the video ID, a cached 
video file, the video name and references to Google ads. While all these artefacts 
can be found, it should be noted that not all of them are always present. The 
following sub-sections describe the artefacts in more detail.  
4.1.1 YouTube ‘watch’ URL 
The first of these artefacts is the YouTube URL.  The URL primarily identifies 
the address of the video that was accessed by the user and can be divided into two 
sections.  The URL identified in Figure 1 is described in detail below. 
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Figure 1: The ‘basic’ YouTube URL 
 
The first section of the URL identifies the domain name for the YouTube website 
i.e. ‘http://www.youtube.com/’.  The second section identifies the unique video ID 
for the video that was accessed, e.g. ‘watch?v=m8S718JvwX8’.  In this example 
the unique video ID is ‘m8S718JvwX8’. This URL can be identified and extracted 
from the index.dat files that make up the history of Internet Explorer (shown in 
Figure 2) and can be found in the master, daily or weekly index.dat files6. 
 
Figure 2: Example of a YouTube video URL in the master index.dat 
 
4.1.2 Video file 
When a YouTube video is accessed, it is possible that a copy of the video is 
stored within one of the sub-folders in the Temporary Internet Files cache.  It is 
given the name videoplayback and is usually assigned a version number, e.g. 
videoplayback[1].  It is not clear at this time what determines if a video is 
definitely stored, how long these videos remain in the cache and under what 
circumstances they are deleted. 
4.1.3 Video name 
The title assigned to a YouTube page that contains a video can also be extracted 
from within the index.dat in the History folder.  The title is stored within the same 
                                                          
6 However, care must be taken when extracting dates and times from these files as they are not 
consistent across different types of index.dat. 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(2) 
50 
record as the page URL. For example in Figure 3 the title for the page is 
‘YouTube - Stuck In Motion - Tokyo Dream’ and the title of the video can be 
obtained by removing the initial ‘YouTube’ string. 
 
Figure 3: Example of a YouTube video title in index.dat 
4.1.4 Google Ad 
A Google Ad artefact may also be present relating to a specific YouTube video 
access. The artefact is located within the index.dat file for the Temporary Internet 
Files and the URL contains one or more references to the video ID of the video, 
which is shown in Figure 4.   
 
Figure 4: The Cache index.dat showing the same video ID 
 
4.2 User Behaviour 
As described in Section 3.4 there are various user behaviours that can be inferred 
from the artefacts identified as a result of a YouTube visit.  Behaviours including 
searches, video accesses and watching related videos are discussed in this 
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section.  Figure 5 shows the output of the custom timelining tool showing a set of 
file and index.dat changes7. 
 
Figure 5: Timeline of file and index.dat changes 
 
The following sub-sections explain how certain user behaviour can be inferred 
from these results.  
4.2.1 YouTube video access 
                                                          
7 Some of the changes are omitted and paths shortened to maintain the clarity of the figure. 
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As described in the previous sections, when a user visits a YouTube video page 
there are a number of artefacts that are created on their system. Figure 6 shows an 
example of the artefacts that may be present after such a visit.  
 
Figure 6: First video access 
 
The first and most common artefact for a ‘basic’ video access is the video page 
URL. This is stored within an index.dat in Internet Explorer’s History 
folder.  Within the same record is the video ID, title and the time and date that 
video was last visited.  Having both the URL and the video title provides more 
detail that can be used to determine the nature of the video accessed by the user.   
A videoplayback file may also be present within the cache of the system that 
relates to the video access.  If present, it is a copy of the YouTube video accessed 
by the user8.  The videoplayback metadata does not contain any information 
relating to the associated video ID, title or URL, so currently, the only method of 
confirming that the video file is related is by comparing the contents of the video. 
As a result, if the file has been deleted (but the MFT entry is still recoverable) it is 
not currently possible to conclusively link the videoplayback file to the other 
artefacts.  
Note that in this case the Google Ad artefact mentioned in Section 4.1.4 is not 
present.  
4.2.2 YouTube video access as a result of a suggested video 
As discussed in Section 4.1.1 when a user watches a video, a copy of the URL for 
that video is stored in the index.dat.  While the example in the previous section 
contains no indication of how the user navigated to the page, in some cases the 
structure of the URLs can be used to infer specific user behaviour.  Figure 7 
shows a slightly more complex example of a URL containing additional 
information. 
 
Figure 7: Example URL accessed as a result of a suggested video 
                                                          
8 There may also be additional video content, e.g. advertisements before the actual video played. 
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This URL holds information relating to how the URL was navigated to.  The 
additional string that reads ‘&feature=related’ and is the result of the user 
clicking on a suggested video link as seen in Figure 8. There are a number of 
different ‘feature’ topics that can be appended to a URL, e.g. ‘top music’ appears 
as ‘feature=topvideos_music’. 
Also in this example, both the videoplayback file and the associated Google Ad 
cache artefact are present. 
 
Figure 8: YouTube suggestions column 
4.2.3 YouTube search 
The previous section shows one way in which a YouTube video could be reached 
(clicking a link for a suggested video). Another route is as a result of a YouTube 
search. When a user searches for a video using YouTube they are directed to a 
page of video results related to their search term and the URL for this page is 
added to an index.dat file within the History folder.  The following URL in Figure 
9 is an example result of a user’s search for ‘wireless hacking tools’. 
 
Figure 9: Example of a manually created YouTube search URL 
 
The first part of this URL is similar to the video URL discussed in Section 4.1.1, 
in that it begins with YouTube’s domain name.  The second part of the URL is 
specific to the search carried out by the user, containing the actual search term i.e. 
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search_query=wireless+hacking+tools.  The final part of the URL is related to 
YouTube’s auto-complete query option and provides further insight into the 
user’s actions including whether they typed the complete search term or typed 
part and selected the full term from YouTube’s drop down search menu. In the 
previous example in Figure 9, the complete search term was typed by the 
user.  The URL in Figure 10 is an example of a search that was partially typed by 
the user and then automatically completed by clicking on one of the suggested 
search terms. 
 
Figure 10: Example of a partially automated YouTube search URL 
 
In this example the search term executed was ‘wireless hacking tools’.  The 
following part of the URL, ‘&aq=6’, indicates which search term was selected 
from the drop down menu.  In this case it was the seventh suggestion as 
numbering starts from zero.  This can be seen in Figure 11.  The final part of this 
URL, ‘&oq=wireless+hack’, indicates how much of the search term was 
physically typed in by the user before selecting the suggested search term. In this 
case ‘wireless hack’ was typed, also shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: Choosing a suggested search term in YouTube 
4.2.4 YouTube video access as a result of a search 
Unlike the example provided of viewing a page as a result of a suggested video, 
accessing a video as a result of a search does not contain any information in the 
URL that can easily demonstrate this. To identify this behaviour, displaying the 
file and index.dat changes in a timeline is essential since a video viewed 
immediately after the result of a search can be said to be likely to be viewed as a 
result of that search, particularly if the video title is examined and shown to be 
related. This is shown in Figure 12.  
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Figure 12: Video access as a result of a search 
 
Furthermore, while cached copies of the search results page have not been found, 
if they were recovered, the source of the search results page could be examined to 
determine any hyperlinks to the videos that were subsequently viewed. 
4.3 Automation 
The previous sections described the artefacts left by particular behaviours related 
to YouTube video access. This section discusses the extent to which this 
reasoning can be automated.  
Using a Python based prototype tool, the sequence of extracted artefacts’ 
metadata was searched for the presence of the various sets of artefacts described 
in the previous section. For example in the case of the ‘basic’ YouTube Video 
access, a regular expression can be applied to each of the URLs recorded to detect 
the ‘watch’ URL: 
re.search(r"http://[a-zA-Z0-9]*?\.youtube\.com/watch\?v=([^&]+)", url) 
If found then it was also possible to test for the videoplayback file: 
re.search(r".*/(videoplayback\[{1}[0-9]].*)$", path) 
and to test for the Google Ad, within a similar time period: 
re.match(r"(http://googleads.g.doubleclick.net)(.+)(video_doc_id=yt_)(.+?)&
", url) 
Similar searches were conducted for the YouTube searches and for videos that 
were watched as a result of a suggestion from another page. The output of this 
automated process is shown in Figure 13, where the results have been 
automatically compiled into an html document. 
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Figure 13: The output from the automated process 
 
A summary of the actual actions performed as logged during the experiment 
were: 
13:35 Launched Internet Explorer 
13:36 The address www.youtube.com typed into the address bar 
13:36 YouTube search for ‘keylogger’ 
13:37  “best keylogger ever” video partially watched 
13:38  “Facebook keylogger” video partially watched from suggested 
13:38  “How to make a keylogger” video watched in full from suggested  
13:47  YouTube search for “install a keylogger” typed and “how to install a 
keylogger” selected from options presented. 
13:47  “Install undetectable and untraceable keylogger” video watched in full 
13:52  Closed Internet Explorer 
13:53  Windows shutdown 
 
As can be seen above, the events detected correlate with the actual events that 
occurred. In addition, as described in Section 2.3, it important to maintain an audit 
trail of how the results of an automated analysis tool are obtained. An extract from 
the log file is shown in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: Output from the log file created while searching for YouTube 
related events 
 
The information recorded in the log file makes it relatively straightforward to 
manually examine the related artefacts if necessary. 
5. EVALUATION 
This section evaluates the research conducted. Each of the stages of the research 
is examined in turn. 
5.1. Artefacts Recovered 
This research has examined the artefacts left by visiting YouTube using Internet 
Explorer 8 on Windows 7 only. There are many other permutations of operating 
system and browser that are likely to produce artefacts in different locations and 
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different formats. This could include other web browsers such as Firefox, 
Chrome, Safari and Opera, on different operating systems such as Windows XP, 
Vista and possibly Mac OS X and Linux. It has also not considered the artefacts 
left on dedicated apps such as those found on iOS. In addition, while the file 
system, Registry and index.dats are examined for artefacts, other locations that 
can contain relevant artefacts were not parsed e.g. Windows Search database.  
5.2 User Behaviour 
The behaviours examined were: 
 The viewing of a video, 
 The viewing of a video as a result of a YouTube suggested video, 
 A YouTube search, 
 The viewing of a video as a result of a YouTube search. 
 
There are obviously other behaviours associated with YouTube video access that 
have not yet been explored, e.g. viewing a YouTube video embedded in another 
web site, or multiple visits to the same website. Nevertheless, the methodology 
used to determine the artefacts left can be easily applied to other behaviours. 
5.3 Automation 
The initial results of the automation are promising. Scanning for the identified 
artefacts has proven successful in detecting different types of visits and of 
YouTube searches. The tool also logs the tests performed and the reasoning for 
the output produced and makes it straightforward to check both the reasoning and 
for the presence of (or lack of) artefacts detected. However, it is important to 
remember that while it is relatively straightforward to perform an action and 
determine the artefacts left, care must be taken in stating that something definitely 
happened because certain artefacts are present. This is because there may be 
alternative explanations for the same set of artefacts. However, the artefacts found 
would be consistent with the inferred behaviour and this does not negate the 
validity and value of this approach. In fact the automation of the process 
combined with thorough logging means that larger numbers of artefacts that 
support a particular inference could be examined, which could reduce the chances 
of reaching incorrect conclusions. 
6. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK  
This research has identified several artefacts of interest related to YouTube 
activity and it has shown how they relate to user actions. In terms of future work, 
as discussed in the evaluation section, there is much work to be done on other 
operating systems and using different web-browsers. There is also much more 
research that can be performed to further understand the makeup of the YouTube 
URL strings and what else can be inferred from them. Also the artefacts deposited 
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by uploading videos to YouTube may be of interest. 
Finally, the research has shown that some automation in terms of summarising the 
activity on a computer system is possible, in this case the use of YouTube. 
However, detailed logging and transparent reasoning for conclusions being drawn 
is believed to be essential and requires further work. Nevertheless, given the 
increasing volumes of data, increasing numbers of digital devices and in most 
cases limited resources, having some indication of which specific systems need to 
be prioritised is desirable.  
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